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ABSTRACT
Developers and users rely on trust to simplify complexity
when building and using software. Unfortunately, the invis-
ibility of trust and the richness of a system’s context of use
means that factors influencing trust are difficult to see, and
assessing its implications before a system is built is complex
and time-consuming. This paper presents an approach for
eliciting and visualising differences between trust expecta-
tions using persona cases, goal models, and complementary
tool support. We evaluate our approach by using it to iden-
tify misplaced trust expectations in a software infrastructure
by its users and application developers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.2 [Software Engineering]: Design Tools and Tech-
niques—Computer-aided software engineering (CASE)
General Terms
Design
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
It has long been acknowledged that, for systems to be se-
cure, they must also be usable. For a system to be usable, it
must attend to the contexts of use associated with all of its
users; these include their goals, the artefacts they use, ac-
tivities they undertake and behaviours they exhibit, and the
physical and social environments within which people oper-
ate. The ability to compute the consequences of the myriad
of social interactions between people in these contexts of use
is an important element of social computing [2]. However,
the richness of contexts of use mean that conflicting goals
arising from different user expectations may be difficult to
identify while a system is still being built.
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Trust is a pervasive element in systems that need to sup-
port social behaviour. Developers rely on trust to reduce
complexity when building a system, while users rely on trust
to remove any unnecessary cognitive burden when using the
same system to satisfy their goals. However, trust and trust-
worthiness mean different things to different people. For
a given activity, individuals with the same role may have
different personal characteristics, and subscribe to differ-
ent norms about how an activity might be undertaken, and
about the social context in general. If the activity is crit-
ical then divergences which seem innocuous to one person
may have a catastrophic impact on somebody else. Con-
sequently, some means of assessing whether a given combi-
nation of people, activities and goals meets specified trust
expectations would be invaluable.
The complexity of social contexts means the ability to
carry out some form of trust assessment is time-consuming
without software support. Building such tools entails the
development and alignment of different models encapsulat-
ing the knowledge needed for such an assessment. While
the types of models needed to reason about the trustwor-
thiness of social agents within different contexts appear to
be eclectic, much of the related work necessary to facilitate
alignment between models already exists. To illustrate this,
we present an approach for eliciting and visualising differ-
ences between trust expectations using persona cases, goal
models, and complementary tool support. We describe the
related work grounding this approach in Section 2, before
presenting the approach itself in Section 3. We describe a
case study evaluating the approach in Section 4, before dis-
cussing some limitations and consequences of this work in
Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Trust and Trust Properties
Trust is a social norm that can be considered as the will-
ingness to be vulnerable, based on the positive expectation
about the actions of others [29]. This expectation can be
tied to many factors, and the mediating role of technology
plays its part in altering or removing signals that a person
or system might rely on to establish trustworthiness. To
explore these factors, Riegelsberger et al. [24] developed
a framework based on the sequential interaction between
trustors (trusting actors) and trustees (trusted actors). In
this framework, trust is the trustor’s internal state concern-
ing the expected behaviour of the trustee in the given con-
text.
Riegelsberger’s framework identified several intrinsic and
contextual trust-warranting properties. Intrinsic properties
are attributes of a trustor or a trustee that lead them to be-
have in a trustworthy manner; examples of such attributes
include motivation (what the actors gain from being trust-
worthy), ability (their inherent competence at carrying out
the activity), internalised norms (their beliefs, values, and
usual patterns of behaviour), and benevolence (the gratifi-
cation earned from helping another). Contextual proper-
ties are attributes of the context that motivate trustwor-
thy behaviour; these include temporal embeddedness (how
trustworthy behaviour will influence future interactions), so-
cial embeddedness (how trustworthy behaviour will influ-
ence interactions within a social grouping), and institutional
embeddedness (how trustworthy behaviour relates to the
broader organisational context).
This framework has been used to reflect on the relation-
ship between trust and related security concepts such as
reliance and assurance [16]. For example, Fle´chais et al.
explain that internalised norms can induce social actors to
behave in a trustworthy manner, and analysing these can
indicate whether actors are likely to break trust.
2.2 Modelling Trust with i*
Work by the Requirements Engineering community has
demonstrated how the norms alluded to by [16], and the
socio-technical elements associated with them, can be vi-
sualised using i* (Intention STrategic Actor Relations): an
agent-oriented approach for modelling and analysing stake-
holder interests, and how they might be addressed or com-
promised in various system and environment alternatives
[28]. Certain concepts are key to i*:
• Goals are conditions in the world that stakeholders
would like to satisfy.
• Softgoals are goals with ill-defined satisfaction criteria.
Such goals are satisficed (as opposed to satisfied) if
they are achieved to an acceptable degree.
• Actors represent autonomous agents (people, hardware,
or software) with intentional goals.
• Tasks represent specific procedures performed by ac-
tors.
• Resources are physical or informational entities.
If an actor intends to achieve a goal then this can be
achieved by either carrying out a task, or by relying on an-
other actor for the achievement of that goal, or a resource
or task necessary for an actor to achieve the goal. These
socio-technical system elements are modelled in two types
of model. Strategic Dependency models illustrate the goal,
task, or resource dependencies between actors. Strategic Ra-
tionale models explain how goals or softgoals positively or
negatively contribute to the achievement of other goals, soft-
goals and tasks; they also connect an actor’s intentional el-
ements to strategic dependencies of other actors, thereby
connecting to strategic dependency models.
In recent years, i* has formed the basis of the Goal-Oriented
Requirements Language (GRL): an international standard
for uncovering, analysing, and describing stakeholder goals
[1]. GRL shares many concepts with i*, but does not distin-
guish between separate strategic rationale and dependency
models. GRL is tool-supported by jUCMNav: a graphical
editor that supports the creation and assessment of Goal-
oriented Requirements Language (GRL) models [22]. GRL
models are assessed by creating strategies; these indicate the
satisfaction of model elements based on the initial satisfac-
tion level of one or more elements, and the contribution links
between them.
Unfortunately, i* based languages have yet to reach their
potential due to the difficulty creating and using them, and
the languages’ bias towards modelling rather than the elic-
itation and analysis of model data. An evaluation of the
visual effectiveness of i* [21] found that its graphical com-
plexity – the number of different elements used in the vi-
sual notation – is nearly three times greater than a human’s
standard limit for distinguishing alternatives; this complex-
ity may significantly reduce the understanding of models
especially by novices.
Despite their challenging nature, several attempts have
been made to use i* based languages to model the impact of
trust. For example, Elahi and Yu [7] propose annotating i*
dependency relationships with ‘trust rationale’. Similarly,
Mouratidis & Giorgini have considered how trust might be
incorporated into Secure Tropos: a security-oriented exten-
sion to the Tropos method, which also adopts the i* frame-
work [19]. This extension entails the introduction of owner-
ship, trust, and delegation concepts, together with processes
for modelling and formally analysing trust and delegation
chains.
Such trust extensions confound the problems highlighted
because both [7] and [19] expand and, in the case of [19],
overload existing i* elements. Problems have also been found
reconciling models in line with stakeholder views, identifying
the most appropriate place to start modelling, and modeller
confusion between cognitive trust and trustworthiness [20,
23].
2.3 Evaluating the Impact of Trust with Per-
sonas
Like the modelling frameworks described in Section 2.2,
usability models describe the impact of human factors when
imagining how a system might be used. Such models are
widely used by User Experience (UX) practitioners, and UX
techniques like scenarios have been successfully appropriated
by software engineers for several years. One such technique
of growing interest to software engineers is the persona tech-
nique. Personas are narrative descriptions of archetypical
users that embody their goals and needs [4]. To contextu-
alise them, personas are often complemented with scenarios;
these envision how potential users (represented as personas)
might interact with the system within its intended or unin-
tended context of use.
Because they are comparatively easy to develop and use,
personas are becoming popular for summarising user re-
search about prospective system stakeholders [3]. Personas
have also been proven useful when engaging stakeholders in
security [10]. The activities necessary to create and apply
personas are also conducive to a security analysis because as
well as identifying affordances for use, affordances for mis-
use and possible vulnerabilities can be identified at the same
time [13]. For example, as a means of simultaneously contex-
tualising sceanarios and envisioning system vulnerabilities,
security premortem scenarios can be applied. These are sce-
narios presented to stakeholders that assume a system has
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Figure 1: Deriving a persona characteristic from
a grounded theory model relationship (taken from
[12])
been exploited, who are then invited to present plausible
reasons are given for explaining why [15]. The premortem
scenario sensitises stakeholders to the personas and the re-
lationship between system goals and persona expectations.
If used effectively, these scenarios can lead to the generation
of insights that might otherwise be missed when considering
personas and their normal course scenarios alone.
While personas and scenarios are useful for reflecting on
the typical behaviour of target users, they are less useful
when considering less frequent behaviour of trust import.
However, work on the Persona Case framework has shown
that qualitative models, such as those that conceptualise
trust, can be used to derive personas [12]. This involves
treating a design problem as a research problem, and de-
vising research questions to characterise it. Qualitative re-
search is then conducted to collect empirical data from the
user population of concern; this might include running qual-
itative interviews, or some form of ethnographic study. The
qualitative data collected is then coded and analysed using
Grounded Theory [5] to develop a conceptual model that
tackles the research problem. Using argumentation models,
each relationship from this conceptual model is structured
to motivate and justify a persona’s characteristic. This is
summarised in Figure 1.
Personas derived from the Persona Case framework con-
sider the impact of trust on their characteristics, but this
impact is largely divorced from systems they might interact
with. It has, however, been shown that, if an activity can be
characterised in use cases, and actors participating in these
use cases can be characterised as personas, then use case
and persona case elements can be aligned with complemen-
tary elements of GRL [8]. This alignment makes it possible
to not only create models that contextualise the impact of
personas on socio-technical system, but also the influence of
trust on these personas.
3. APPROACH
We have devised an approach for exploring how warranted
the trust expectations of different system stakeholders might
be. The Persona Case framework [12] is used to develop a
qualitative model from which trust characteristics of per-
sonas are derived. By re-framing these characteristics and
their supporting elements as social goals and contribution
links, GRL models can be generated. These models are then
subject to further analysis to explore additional dependen-
cies between personas. We elaborate this approach in the
sub-sections below.
3.1 Eliciting Persona Trust Characteristics
The first step involves eliciting persona characteristics that
attend to trust expectations. To do this, we use Riegels-
berger’s framework for trust in technology-mediated inter-
actions [24] to support a grounded theory analysis of trust
factors influencing a particular user population. The re-
search questions that drive the coding process are motivated
by this framework, and include questions about intrinsic and
contextual trust properties. We then use the Persona Case
framework to derive intrinsic or contextual persona char-
acteristics from each relationship in the grounded theory
model.
3.2 Deriving GRL Model Elements from Per-
sona Characteristics
Once the persona characteristics have been created, we
analyse both the characteristics and their contributing el-
ements to identify goals, softgoals, or tasks that might be
implied by the characteristic. For each contributing element,
we also identify whether the element is a ‘means’ or an ‘end’
given the contribution relationship, and how much the el-
ement contributes to this relationship. More information
about how persona characteristics align with these GRL el-
ements is provided by [8].
3.3 Generating and Analysing the GRLModel
A GRL model is now generated by CAIRIS to visualise the
social goals associated with the personas in a given context
of use, as well as the contribution and dependency relation-
ships between them. The model is created by exporting the
GRL elements associated with a particular activity. The
GRL model created is then directly imported into jUCM-
Nav where, in conjunction with system stakeholders, it is
interpreted in two steps. In the first step, strategies are ap-
plied to explore the implications of dissatisfying particular
goals, softgoals, and tasks. These strategies also help iden-
tify contribution links between persona goals which appear
to be missing. In the second step, possible dependencies
between the personas in the GRL model are identified us-
ing security premortem scenarios. These scenarios sensitises
stakeholders to the personas and their characteristics, and
creates context for denied goals. Based on the responses
given, the model is evaluated to determine whether such
a scenario might be possible and, if so, what dependencies
need to hold between the personas to realise it.
Based on any changes made to the GRL model, the quali-
tative models, personas, and system specifications are revis-
ited based on any new insights.
3.4 Tool Support
Rather than developing software tools from scratch, our
framework is supported by customising and building inter-
faces between two pre-existing software tools: CAIRIS, and
jUCMNav.
3.4.1 CAIRIS
CAIRIS (Computer Aided Integration of Requirements
and Information Security) is an open-source Requirements
Management tool designed to support the specification of
interactive secure systems [9]. In addition to managing re-
quirements models such as use cases and goal models, CAIRIS
also manages the data associated with several security and
usability engineering models, such as risks, scenarios, and
personas. CAIRIS complements the use of specific security,
requirements, and usability engineering techniques. If these
techniques are properly applied, then models arising from
them can be directly entered or imported into CAIRIS. The
impact that the presence of personas might have on a sys-
tem’s design can then be analysed. For example, [11] illus-
trates how the alignment between personas, scenarios, and
risk analysis models can be used to visualise both the secu-
rity and usability impact of different scenarios to personas.
CAIRIS was recently extended to support the Persona
Case framework set out in [12], and incorporates the func-
tionality necessary to support a grounded theory analysis.
This includes the ability to annotate imported text docu-
ments with codes and memos, and the functionality neces-
sary for creating and visualising relationships between codes.
These extensions are described in more detail in [14].
Given the alignment between models supported by CAIRIS
and GRL [8], we have also updated the user interfaces for
working with persona qualitative models to include controls
for specifying intentional and contribution data associated
with quotations. Using CAIRIS’ export functionality, it is
then possible to generate an XML-based GRL model for a
selected activity. This activity needs to encompass one or
more use cases and personas.
3.4.2 jUCMNav
jUCMNav is used to visualise the GRL models created
by CAIRIS. Using jUCMNav’s strategy functionality, it is
possible to visualise the contribution of satisfying or dissat-
isfying one or more goals, softgoals, or tasks in the broader
GRL model.
No changes were made to the default installation of jUCM-
Nav to support this approach.
4. CASE STUDY
4.1 webinos
We evaluated our approach by using it to help evaluate
the design of a software infrastructure. We were specifi-
cally interested in finding potential problems resulting from
misplaced trust expectations by its users and application
developers. This software infrastructure, webinos, is a fed-
erated, open-source communications platform. webinos was
designed to support web applications running consistently
and securely across mobile, PC, home media, and in-car
systems [18]. We chose a case study example based on webi-
nos because, unlike many open-source projects, much of the
design data upon which the webinos architecture is based is
publicly available [26]; this data includes personas that mo-
tivated the webinos platform, and use cases specifying how
users should interact with applications using webinos.
Identifying trust problems for webinos is difficult for sev-
eral reasons. First, because infrastructures like webinos are
invisible to most users, and perceived only through soft-
ware applications built upon them [6], any evaluation of the
infrastructure will be episodic and based on surface inter-
actions, rather than their implications. Second, while the
personas created for webinos were designed to explore the
security expectations of target users, the data upon which
they were based was not based on security decision making.
This means that assumptions need to be made about how
personas may think or respond to issues relating to trust.
Finally, the invisibility of webinos means that what consti-
tutes effective and secure use is unclear to both users and
application developers. For example, users of webinos appli-
cations may trust developers to select the most appropriate
security defaults for them. Similarly, application developers
may be over-confident of their users’ ability to configure and
use their apps in a secure manner.
We used the approach to identify trust problems associ-
ated with installing and configuring the webinos concept ap-
plication ‘Kids in Focus’: an in-car game for children. The
application was used by a user persona (Helen) and created
by an application developer persona (Jimmy); these per-
sonas are described in more detail in [27]. The game allows
Helen’s young son to play an online card game with Helen’s
father at home. This application was developed by a small
team of developers and user interface designers to demon-
strate how webinos can facilitate secure communications be-
tween an in-car telematics system and a home network. This
team was supported by the authors, who were involved in
both the human-centered and architectural design of we-
binos. The source code for Kids in Focus is available on
GitHub [25].
The specification for installing webinos applications is de-
fined in a single use case (Installation and update of webinos
applications).
4.2 Approach Applied
4.2.1 Eliciting Persona Trust Characteristics
We began by developing trust characteristics to augment
the pre-existing Helen and Jimmy personas introduced in
Section 4.1. To do this, we carried out the qualitative data
analysis stages of this step using pre-existing data collected
during workshops attended by prospective webinos users and
developers. These users and developers were recruited based
on shared characteristics with the Helen and Jimmy per-
sonas respectively, and the workshops considered how the
participants made access control decisions. For each per-
sona, three 1.5 hour workshops were held and, following
each, the workshop facilitator wrote a report on the out-
come of the session.
These reports were subject to a grounded theory anal-
ysis to develop trust characteristics for the two personas.
Riegelsberger’s framework was used to develop a series of
sensitising questions; these questions help analysts variate
and make connections between different codes during the
grounded theory analysis [5]. To illustrate these, Figure 2
shows the sensitising questions used to code Helen workshop
reports.
From the grounded theory analysis, 57 and 37 quotations
were elicited based on the Helen and Jimmy focus group re-
ports respectively; these quotations were based on 26 codes.
The relationships between these codes for Jimmy are illus-
trated in Figure 3; the numbers shown in each box after the
Trust type Trust 
property
Sensitising Question
Intrinsic Obligations Does Helen have the ability to fulfil her part when installing Kids 
in Focus?
Habits Might Helen’s own norms influence her motivation for following 
in the approved Kids in Focus installation procedure?
Gratification What intrinsic gratification does Helen gain from installing Kids 
in Focus securely?
Contextual Future How much do thoughts of future use affect the propensity to trust 
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Social What impact does the social thinking of others affect the 
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Institutions How much do institutions associated with Helen and Kids in 
Focus affect the propensity to trust the Kids in Focus installation.
Figure 2: Helen Sensitising Questions
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Figure 3: Qualitative model of Jimmy trust charac-
teristics
code names indicate how many quotations were associated
with that code. Figure 4 illustrates how the characteris-
tic Knowing the user increases tendency to trust them is a
synopsis of the code relationship between the role possibility
and emergent trust codes.
4.2.2 Deriving GRL Model Elements from Persona
Characteristics
As prescribed by Section 3.2, the grounded theory rela-
tionship behind each persona characteristic was analysed
to identify implicit intentional elements and contribution
links. In considering the relationship illustrated in Figure
4, the trust that Jimmy develops as a result of knowing his
user community implies that he possesses the softgoal Trust
known users.
Each element underpinning this relationship also suggests
implied goals or softgoals that either contribute to this soft-
goal, or this softgoal makes a contribution to. For exam-
ple, the preferential stakeholder element is associated with
the synopsis that security discussions favour one group of
stakeholders over others; this implies that Jimmy holds the
softgoal Favour users. Similarly, Resource-driven thinking
indicates that developer thinking about security drifts to
thinking about resources needed by users, rather than what
the system currently offers them; this implies that Jimmy
possesses the goal Determining user resources. When con-
sidering the softgoal and goal within the broader context of
the persona, Favour user appears to have a significant pos-
itive contribution towards the Trust known users softgoal,
and Trust known users appears to have a weak, but nonethe-
less positive, contribution towards the goal Determine user
resources.
4.2.3 Generating and Analysing the GRL Model
Figure 4: Trust characteristic for Jimmy derived
from code relationship
Figure 5: GRL model export and import flow
Figure 6: Initial GRL Model generated from the Helen and Jimmy personas, and Installation and update of
webinos applications use case (left), with a zoomed portion of the model illustrating the impact of an applied
strategy (right)
Using CAIRIS, an initial GRL model was generated to
visualise Helen’s expectations when installing a webinos ap-
plication, and Jimmy’s expectations when developing the
installation procedures for the same application. As Figure
5 shows for the highlighted element in Figure 4, the informa-
tion captured by CAIRIS about intentions and contribution
links is used to generate GRL which, when imported into
jUCMNav, is interpreted as a visual model.
The complete version of this initial model is shown in
Figure 6 (left). Although the predominant actors in the
model are human (Helen and Jimmy), two software based
actors (Policy Manager and Discovery Manager) and associ-
ated tasks are also created; these indicate the responsibility
webinos software components also have in the installation
process. Further discussion on the role and nature of these
latter actors, and how GRL is derived from the use case is
beyond the scope of this paper.
To begin interpreting this model, we applied a strategy to
explore the implications of Jimmy having difficulty making
decisions about the data ‘Kids in Focus’ users need access to
(dissatisfaction of the Apply access heuristic task), and be-
coming doubtful about the confidence he has about his users’
expectations (dissatisfaction of the Trust known users soft-
goal). The strategy also explores the implications of Helen
finding difficulty applying access control for ‘Kids in Focus’
(dissatisfaction of the Modify child access and Share usage
data goals), and the cognitive difficulty Helen might have
simultaneously thinking about access control while think-
ing about her young son (minor dissatisfaction of the Share
usage data and Parent toddler softgoals).
On viewing the initial model, we identified an additional
contribution link between goals associated with Helen as
well as Jimmy. Helen held a Determine content provider
trust goal to indicate her belief that content providers have
full control over all aspects of access control. This goal ap-
peared to positively contribute to Helen’s Share usage data
goal; this goal was associated with a pre-existing character-
istic indicating that Helen would be prepared to share usage
information if this led to a positive user experience.
To explore the trust dependencies between Helen and Jimmy,
we developed the premortem scenario below. This drew not
only on Helen and ‘Kids in Focus’ but also the software
installation process that Jimmy was responsible for main-
taining.
Helen installed ‘Kids in Focus’ on her laptop so Eric could
play with Peter (Helen’s father) while travelling. A month
after installing the application, Helen went on a road trip
to a friend. Helen drove into a service station to get some
sweets for Eric, but left Eric in the car. When he returned,
Eric was gone. Police found that Eric had been playing with
a new friend on ‘Kids in Focus’ in the days leading up to the
trip. Forensic investigators believe that some aspect of the
application installation process allowed a stranger to obtain
private information about Helen and her child. How might
this have happened?
We presented this premortem to a webinos team member
familiar with ‘Kids in Focus’, who proposed the following
causes.
• Helen over-shared access to her devices with whole
world, and the ‘Kids in Focus’ service was randomly
found.
• Helen’s account was hijacked and the kidnapper added
himself as a valid contact.
• Helen’s father inadvertently sent the application to the
kidnapper, who captured analytics about Helen; he
knew enough to dis-aggregate useful information from
the analytics.
• An attacker found a vulnerability in the open source
application.
On considering the 3rd cause, we identified missing, but
plausible, contribution and dependency links that facilitated
this premortem. These included a contribution link between
Jimmy’s Ponder access control goal, to his Trust known
users soft goal; this indicates that Jimmy’s pondering on
the complexity of access control places unwarranted trust
on his end-users. We also identified that Jimmy’s Deter-
mine user capabilities goals depends on a goal that Helen
has to Share usage data, where the dependum is analytics
data. Up until this point, the nature of the analytics data,
and the unwarranted trust that Helen might have in what
Jimmy needs to collect had not been considered.
5. DISCUSSION
Although illustrative, the case study example in Section
4 is comparatively trivial; it considers only two personas
where differences in expectations can be identified from in-
specting the trust characteristics alone. The framework is,
however, scalable to activities involving more than two per-
sonas. This is particularly useful in critical systems where
some level of assurance is needed about the trustworthiness
of personas to undertake certain activities. However, addi-
tional techniques may be necessary for making sense of very
large GRL models.
An unintentional benefit of this approach is that it en-
courages designers to use and engage in personas in more
depth than they might using personas as a communication
tool alone. This is important because, even when used in
conjunction with other artefacts like scenarios and cognitive
walkthroughs, personas are insufficient for ensuring end-user
needs are incorporated into the design process [17]. By forc-
ing designers to use personas as an analytical tool, the suc-
cess of this approach relies on personas being actively, rather
than passively, adopted.
This approach is of particular benefit to social software
engineers that wish to explore and visualise the relationship
between different aspects of socialness and the software they
develop. Although this approach focused on trust expecta-
tions, designers may wish to develop social characteristics
that appeal to a user populations incentives for engagement,
social awareness, or other as yet unforeseen scenarios in the
social software engineering research agenda. In the same
way that Riegelsberger’s framework for trust in technology
mediated interactions provided a basis for guiding the anal-
ysis necessary to build trust characteristics, other social in-
formatics theories form the basis for supporting a grounded
theory analysis for creating and visualising different charac-
teristics of interest.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an approach for eliciting and visu-
alising differences between trust expectations using persona
trust characteristics, goal models, and complementary tool
support. In doing so, we have made three contributions.
First, we have illustrated how Riegelsberger’s framework
for trust in technology-mediated interactions helps derive
trust characteristics for personas. In doing so, we have
shown how our approach can attend to trust at the out-
set of a project. Moreover, by describing the different facets
and expectations of trust using personas, the implications
of trust can be made transparent to different stakeholders.
Although the qualitative data analysis used in this approach
can be time-consuming, it is little more time consuming than
creating personas using the Persona Case framework.
Second, we have demonstrated that analysable goal mod-
els can be derived from these characteristics. These models
further increase the transparency of trust by visualising how
goal contributions and dependencies influence a persona’s
propensity to trust, and how warranted his/her assumptions
might be given the characteristics of other personas.
Finally, we have described a case study to illustrate the
validity of our approach. We accept that this approach is
not a panacea for eliciting all possible trust implications for
a given system. Moreover, for social software engineers to
adopt this approach, they will need to add personas and i*
based modelling languages to their repertoire of design tech-
niques. While the approach makes the creation of personas
no less time consuming, we have shown how, with the aid of
software tools, this effort can be leveraged to automatically
generate large goal models that might otherwise be slow and
cumbersome to create.
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